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trade he were, he could not justify his cost differential under this approach. The present, and undoubtedly future, activities of trade associations, may aid greatly in effectuating this type of a statute by giving to state officials, retailers, and courts the
criteria by which to judge the level of cost. These activities are in outlining accounting
principles applicable to each trade and in conducting cost surveys for different trades
in particular localities. Confining trade associations to aiding courts in determining
cost, eliminates, on the one hand, the objection to government-dominated associations,
as for example, under the N.R.A., and on the other hand, offers the opportunity for
modified self regulation to be exercised by the individual trades.
A statute has recently been proposed by the grocers association in lieu of any general unfair practices act applicable to its members. The proposal is to define cost as
invoice cost plus a minimum mark-up of 6%. The advantages of such a statute are
that it gives the business man a quick method of determining his legally minimum
selling price, and the government authorities an easy way of detecting violations. But
the percentage fixed as the minimum mark-up must necessarily be an arbitrary figure.
Furthermore, such a statute may be stigmatized as legislative price fixing.12
Regardless of the type of statute used, however, there is now an unmistakable
legislative disposition in the United States to supplement the "vertical" operation of
existing resale price maintenance laws with the "horizontal" operation of sales below
cost laws.
Wills-Election-Devise of Another's Property-[Ohio].-A husband devised a
life estate in several parcels of land to his wife and a remainder in fee to the plaintiff.
One of these parcels, the Melish Ave. land, was owned at this time in fee by the wife.
After his death, the wife accepted the various life estates under the will and later
devised the Melish Ave. land to the defendant. The executor of the wife's will made
an application to the probate court for a certificate of transfer' of the land to the defendant. The plaintiff thereupon filed suit alleging ownership of the fee under the
husband's will. The defendant demurred. Held, judgment for the plaintiff since the
intention of the husband was to confer benefits, including the life estate, upon his wife
only if she relinquished her fee in the Melish Ave. land according to his will. Foyes v.
Grossman.2
The reasoning of the court is unconvincing because it is based upon the assumption
that the husband knew that he did not own the Melish Ave. land. In his will, the
husband referred to the parcels of land collectively as "my real estate." Moreover, had
he known that his wife owned this property, he probably would have adopted the
simple method of bequeathing the other property to his wife, upon the express condition3 that she convey the remainder in the Melish Ave. land to the plaintiff, instead of
conveying the wife's property to the plaintiff.
But even though the husband mistakenly believed all the parcels of land to be his
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own, the decision is nevertheless supported by practically unanimous authority.4 This
6
authority is phrased in terms of estoppels one who seeks equity must do equity, one
who takes under a will cannot take against it the intent of the testator,8 or fairness.9
Such language, however, is not persuasive. Estoppel rests upon the alleged inconsistency of first claiming the life estate in the disputed property under the will, and later
asserting an original title in fee. These assertions are inconsistent, however, only if the
real point in issue is assumed, viz, that a devisee whose realty is devised to another cannot both accept the benefits of the will and retain her property. The equitable principle that one who seeks equity must do equity is convincing only if we assume that it
would be inequitable for the plaintiff to claim the benefits provided under a will without relinquishing her pre-existing property rights. The phrase that one who takes under a will cannot take against it is but a restatement of the result. The intention of the
testator offers no solution, for, as previously indicated, his most likely intent was to
devise his own property. "General principles of fairness," if not meaningless, is too
vague a phrase for application.
Instead of laying the emphasis on the grantee's actions, the result of these cases
might be governed by the probable disposition, had the testator known the true state
of title. From an examination of the collateral facts of the American cases in point, the
most common probable dispositions by the testators, had they been informed that the
property in question was not theirs, would have been either: (i) a devise to the ownerdevisee expressly conditioned upon her relinquishment of all her property rights in the
disputed realty to the other devisees; or (2) a devise to the other devisees of only the
testator's property, but in an amount which would equal the original bequest plus the
°
value of the relinquished land of the owner-devisee.1 Either of these approaches give
to the owner-devisee and the other devisees the same resultant value of property,
though from different sources. Thus the rigid rule enunciated by the courts in all but
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a few rare cases"r reaches substantially the same result as that indicated by this more
realistic approach.
A possible objection to the result of these cases is that they permit a testator to
effect a conveyance of another's property.12 This is no hardship upon the owner, however, since he may always elect to retain his land, rather than accept a life estate in his
and other property, as a donee under the will. An analogous doctrine, that of estoppel
by deed, has for centuries made valid a conveyance of another's property to a third
person when the grantor subsequently acquired title.' x A second objection may be the
lack of a deed from one devisee to the other. However, the formalities surrounding the
execution of a will make the transfer definite, and guard against fraud; while probating
the will assures against any irregularity in the chain of title.
11Lewis v. Carver, i4o Md. 121, 117 Atl. io8 (1922); Hibbs v. Ins. Co., 4o Ohio 542 (1884).
2Beard v. Knox, 5 Cal. 252 (1855); dicta criticized and case distinguished in Morrison v.
Bowman, 29 Cal. 337 (i865).
'3Bigelow, Law of Estoppel 418 (16th ed. 1913).

